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1. Introduction 
According to metaethical realists, some actions, character-
traits, states of affairs, and the like (hereafter simply 
‘objects’) have stance-independent normative properties: 
there are actions we ought to do and outcomes that are 
good in a way that does not depend on our attitudes 
towards them. Metaethical realists then disagree about the 
nature of these properties. The naturalists think that they 
are ordinary natural properties: causally efficacious, a 
posteriori knowable, and usable in the best explanations of 
natural and social sciences.1 The non-naturalists, in 
contrast, argue that they are sui generis: causally inert, a 
priori knowable, not a part of the subject matter of 
sciences, and yet a ‘part of the fundamental nature of the 
universe’ (Ross 2002 [1930], 29–30).2  
                                                
1 There is a disagreement about the distinguishing features of natural 
properties. Causal efficacy was emphasized by Lewis (1983: sec. 2), 
empirical knowability by Copp (2003), and being used in scientific 
explanations by Little (1994). Moore (1903: 40) and Shafer-Landau 
(2006: 211) believe that naturalness is a matter of being part of the 
subject matter of sciences. I will also count disjunctive properties the 
disjuncts of which are natural properties as natural properties even if 
they might not satisfy the previous criteria themselves. This is because 
such properties are not different kind of properties in the way that the 
non-naturalists assume normative properties are. 
2 Some non-naturalists do not think that normative properties exist 
metaphysically (see, for example, Parfit (2011, vol. 2, 479), Scanlon 
(2014, ch. 2), and Nagel (1996, 205)). For my objections to these views, 
see Suikkanen (2016). The metaphysically robust non-naturalists 
discussed here include at least Enoch (2011), Huemer (2005), Ross 
(2002 [1930]), Shafer-Landau (2003), and Wielenberg (2014). 
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The metaphysical and epistemological objections to non-
naturalism have already been discussed extensively.3 This 
article focuses therefore on a less discussed metasemantic 
question.4 Our natural language contains a number of 
normative predicates such as ‘ought’, ‘…is a reason to…’, 
‘good’, ‘better’, ‘right’, and so on.5 According to the non-
naturalists, there are non-natural normative properties: 
the property of being what one ought to do, the relation of 
reasonhood, the property of goodness, and so on. The 
non-naturalists then believe that the normative predicates 
refer to the previous normative properties: ‘ought’ refers 
to being what one ought to do, ‘…is a reason to…’ to the 
reasonhood relation, ‘good’ to goodness, and so on.  
The metasemantic challenge for the non-naturalists is to 
provide an explanation of how the previous normative 
predicates manage to refer to the relevant non-natural 
normative properties. What is the ‘semantic glue’ that 
binds the relevant predicates to the corresponding 
properties?6 There are, furthermore, three adequacy 
conditions for the solutions to the previous challenge – 
three further challenges that the non-naturalists must be 
able to meet. They need to explain, first of all, how the 
normative words manage to refer to the non-natural 
properties instead of natural ones. This ‘Contrast 
                                                
3 See Mackie (1977, ch. 1). For a recent version of the epistemological 
objection, see Bedke (2009), and for a corresponding metaphysical 
objection, see McPherson (2012). For responses, see Enoch (2011, chs. 
6–7), Huemer (2005, chs. 5 and 8), Shafer-Landau (2003, chs. 3–4 and 
10–12), Wedgwood (2007, 6–11), and Wielenberg (2014, chs. 1 and 3). 
4 See Wedgwood (2007: sec. 1.2) and Setiya (2011: 1283). The question 
of what the referents of normative predicates are is a semantic 
question, whereas how they came to have those referents is a 
metasemantic question.  
5 Following Wedgwood (2007: sec. 1.3), I take the defining feature of 
normative predicates to be that, when we use them to make 
judgments, there is a requirement of rationality to have certain 
motivational states. This is why some evaluative concepts such as 
‘good’ and deontic concepts such as ‘wrong’ are also normative 
concepts. I say more about the sense of normative concepts in §5. 
6 The normative concepts need not pick out the same property on each 
occasion of use. Following Kripke (1979a), we can distinguish between 
what the concept itself refers to and what a speaker refers to when 
using the expression. The metasemantic challenge investigated here 
concerns the former question. 
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Challenge’ has become more pressing recently because it 
has become evident that, for every non-natural normative 
property that the non-naturalists posit, there is a 
necessarily co-instantiated natural property.7  
Any good object, for example, will have the conjunctive 
natural property constituted by its all natural properties (it 
has the property of being F, G, not-H, …, and Z – it is D1 
for short). Every possible good object will then have a 
similar comprehensive conjunctive natural property. This 
means that all possible good objects have the disjunctive 
natural property of being D1, D2, …, or Dn. And given 
supervenience, no object that is not good has that 
property.8 This is why goodness and being D1, D2, …, or 
Dn are necessarily co-instantiated. A central part of the 
Contrast Challenge is then to explain how the predicate 
‘good’ manages to refer to the non-natural property of 
goodness instead of the underlying necessarily co-
instantiated property of being D1, D2, …, or Dn. 
The non-naturalists also need to explain why ‘good’, for 
example, refers to the property of goodness rather to some 
other non-natural property such as rightness. Call this the 
‘Correct Property Challenge’. This challenge is 
surprisingly pressing concern for two reasons. Firstly, 
some non-naturalists believe that there are thick 
normative predicates such as the aesthetic predicates ‘… 
has grace’ and ‘… is delicate’ and they also assume that 
these predicates refer to the non-natural properties of 
grace and delicacy (see Crisp 2005: 82). Here the task for 
                                                
7 See Kim (1984), Jackson (1998: 122–123), and Gibbard (2003: 94–102). 
Majors (2005) denies that the base property would be a natural 
property. As explained in footnote 1, I count all properties formed by 
Boolean operations from the paradigmatic natural properties to be 
natural properties too. Jackson (1998: 123) goes onto argue that 
necessarily co-instantiated properties are identical.  If Jackson’s 
criterion of property identity is correct, then the question of how 
normative predicates could refer to non-natural properties would not 
arise – there would not be such properties. For a discussion, see 
Suikkanen (2010). 
8 Supervenience is roughly the thesis that two objects cannot have 
different normative properties without having different natural 
properties. Jackson (1998, 119) relied on global supervenience, but 
Williamson (2001) showed that Jackson’s argument requires the truth 
of strong supervenience. 
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the non-naturalists is to explain just how the predicate ‘… 
has grace’ manages to refer to grace rather than delicacy 
given that the ways in which these predicates are used are 
almost identical. Many of the same objects are both 
graceful and delicate and the reactions these properties 
call for are also very similar. The second reason this 
challenge is rather pressing is that, as explained in §5 
below, it turns out to be the most difficult to respond to. 
Finally, the non-naturalists also face a version of the grue 
problem – call it the ‘Gruesome Normative Property 
Challenge’.9 Grueness is stipulated to be the property of 
being green when examined before certain time t in the 
distant future or being blue otherwise. In the case of 
colours, one metasemantic challenge is to explain how 
‘green’ manages to refer to greenness rather than to 
grueness. Similarly, the non-naturalists need to explain 
how the normative predicates manage to refer to the 
standard normative properties rather than to their 
gruesome counterparts. Why does ‘good’, for example, 
refer to goodness rather than to the property of being 
good if inside this light cone and being cruel elsewhere?  
If the non-naturalists cannot respond to the previous 
challenges, then synthetic versions of naturalism might 
seem to be more plausible views in metaethics.10 They 
could, after all, attempt to explain how normative 
predicates refer to certain natural properties by relying on 
the essential qualities of the natural properties such as 
their causal powers. The synthetic naturalists do not face 
the Contrast Challenge, and they could try to use the 
causal connections between normative predicates and 
natural properties to meet the other two challenges.  They 
could, for example, argue that ‘good’ refers to goodness – 
a certain natural property – rather than to any other 
natural property because that property governs causally 
                                                
9 The grue-paradox, i.e, the ‘new riddle of induction’, was original 
formulated by Goodman (1983: 72–81).  
10 According to synthetic naturalists, the sense aspect of the meaning 
of normative predicates (what cognitive significance they have for the 
speakers) does not determine their reference. See, e.g., Boyd (1988), 
Brink (1989), Copp (2000), and Schroeder (2007). Analytic naturalists, 
in contrast, take the meaning of normative predicates to fix their 
reference (see §2 below). 
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the core uses of the term in an epistemically beneficial way 
(Boyd 1988: 195).  
This article attempts to show that the previous 
assumptions are mistaken. It argues that (i) both non-
naturalists and synthetic naturalists have to rely on the 
same non-causal mechanism to explain reference and that 
(ii) both have equally good resources for making use of that 
mechanism. As a consequence, my conclusion will be that 
there is no reason to prefer synthetic naturalism to non-
naturalism at least on metasemantic grounds.  
My argument proceeds in four sections. §2 explains why 
the non-naturalists cannot rely on basic descriptivist or 
Fregean metasemantic accounts as a response to the 
previous challenges. §3 then argues that Ralph 
Wedgwood’s (2001 and 2007, ch. 4) conceptual role 
semantics will not help the non-naturalists either.  
In §4, I argue that the synthetic naturalists cannot give 
purely causal accounts of how normative predicates refer 
because of the qua-problem, which has not yet received 
sufficient attention in metaethics. Finally, §5 suggests both 
(i) that the most promising way for the synthetic 
naturalists to avoid the qua-problem relies on the non-
causal mechanism of reference magnetism and (ii) that the 
non-naturalists too can rely on it to meet the metasemantic 
challenges they face.  
2. Descriptivism and Fregean Views of 
Predicates 
Let us begin from why the non-naturalists cannot rely on 
simple versions of descriptivism. According to them, the 
meaning of a predicate ‘… is P’ consists of a set of 
descriptions which an object must satisfy in order for it to 
count as P.11 These are the descriptions which a speaker 
must know for being able to use the predicate in question 
with competence. For example, the meaning of ‘… is a 
bachelor’ is said to consist of the descriptions ‘… is male’ 
and ‘… is unmarried’, which a person must satisfy in 
                                                
11 Descriptivism can be traced back to Frege (1997a [1892]). It has been 
defended in different forms by Russell (1905), Strawson (1950), Searle 
(1958), and others.  
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order to be a bachelor. The idea is then that predicates 
refer to the property in virtue of which objects satisfy the 
meaning-constituting descriptions. Thus, because these 
descriptions pick out in the previous example the property 
of being an unmarried male, the predicate ‘… is a 
bachelor’ refers to that property. After all, a person counts 
as a bachelor in virtue of having it. 
The meaning of the normative predicate ‘…is good’ could 
also be suggested to consist of some descriptions ‘R’ and 
‘S’, which a competent speaker must know and which an 
object must satisfy in order to count as good. The claim 
would then be that ‘good’ refers to Rness and Sness 
because objects count as good in virtue of satisfying the 
descriptions ‘R’ and ‘S’. 
This view, sadly, is not available for the non-naturalists. 
Either the meaning-constituting descriptions are 
formulated in wholly non-normative vocabulary or they 
include some normative predicates. If the descriptions are 
wholly non-normative, then the view entails that 
normative predicates refer to natural properties.12 If they 
include normative predicates, we face the same question: 
how did these other normative predicates acquire their 
reference? If the non-naturalists insist that they too 
acquired their reference via some meaning-constituting 
descriptions, no progress has been made. Again, either the 
                                                
12 The resulting view is analytic naturalism. G.E. Moore (1903: §39) 
famously attributed this view to John Stuart Mill. Smith (1994) and 
Finlay (2014) defend more sophisticated versions. These views can 
provide a plausible metasemantic account for normative predicates if 
they can explain how the meaning-constituting descriptions pick out 
the relevant natural properties. The non-naturalists could attempt to 
avoid the previous problem by appealing to indirect reference-fixing 
descriptions like ‘… is the sui generis non-natural property that fills 
such and such role’ or ‘… is the sui generis non-natural property that is 
shared by most of these instances’. Here the question would be how 
the vocabulary in these definite descriptions manages to pick out their 
intended referents without relying on further descriptions. It could be 
suggested these words (such as ‘non-natural property’) acquire their 
semantic values through some form of ‘direct understanding’. 
However, if direct understanding is not sufficient to explain how 
normative predicates refer to the non-natural properties in the first 
place, then it is difficult to see how it could explain how the previous 
descriptions acquire their referents either. 
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new meaning-constituting descriptions contain only non-
normative predicates in which case naturalism follows, or 
they include normative predicates in which case we face a 
regress again.  
Non-naturalists are sometimes accused of ‘metasemantic 
quietism’, of ignoring the metasemantic questions 
(Wedgwood 2007: 3–4 and 21). Perhaps the non-naturalists 
have done so because they have assumed a more general 
form of descriptivism.13 According to it, normative 
predicates refer to the relevant non-natural normative 
properties because (i) normative predicates refer to 
whatever properties they must in order for our carefully 
considered core normative convictions to be true and (ii) if 
these predicates referred to any other properties then at 
least some of those convictions would be false.  
The non-naturalists could motivate (i) with the principle 
of charity.14 It is widely accepted that, in trying to interpret 
what others mean, we should assume that they talk about 
objects, properties, and facts that make most of their 
utterances true. Many of the non-naturalists’ arguments 
against different naturalist reductions of normative 
properties could then be understood as supporting (ii). 
They attempt to show that, if the normative predicates 
referred to the natural properties to which the naturalists 
claim they refer, some of our core normative convictions 
would be false.15  
This proposal fails for two reasons. Firstly, it fails to 
address the Contrast Challenge. §1 explained how, for 
every non-natural normative property posited by the non-
naturalists, there is a necessarily co-instantiated natural 
                                                
13 See Lewis (1984: 224) and Sider (2011: 24). The first type of 
descriptivism above is ‘local descriptivism’. It assumes that the 
meaning-constituting descriptions already refer non-problematically. 
If, however, the meaning of all expressions consisted of some 
descriptions, we would face the problem of how our language 
manages to refer as a whole. ‘Global descriptivism’ is designed to 
address that question. This view is compatible with the idea that 
normative predicates are unanalyzable. 
14 See Dennett (1982), Lewis (1974), Quine (1960), and Davidson (2001).  
15 See, for example, Parfit’s (2011, vol. 1: 73–82) agony argument 
according to which analytic reductions of reasons cannot guarantee 
that we have reasons to avoid future agony. 
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property. The problem is that exactly the same first-order 
normative claims would be true even when the normative 
predicates referred to those natural properties. After all, 
whichever necessarily co-instantiated non-natural and 
natural property pair we take, exactly the same objects 
have those properties. 
Secondly, it is worthwhile to recall that Hilary Putnam 
used his model-theoretic argument to show that we 
cannot use the truth of our first-order theories to explain 
reference in the previous way because doing so leaves 
reference ‘inscrutable’ (Putnam 1977 and 1981: 32–35 and 
217–218).16 In this context, the crux of his argument is that, 
whatever first-order normative theory we accept, every 
claim of that theory remains true when we systematically 
re-assign new referents to all the terms used to formulate 
our theory in a structurally isomorphic pattern. The 
sentence ‘eating meat is wrong’ thus remains true in the 
interpretation in which ‘eating meat’ refers to trench coats 
and ‘is wrong’ to being fashionable. We would, of course, 
then need to give a new referent to ‘killing’ too – such as 
holding a dinner party – given that the sentence ‘killing is 
wrong’ is true. If we continue re-assigning referents in this 
way, all the normative claims we currently take to be true 
will remain true. This is why the truth of our first-order 
normative theory is not sufficient to restrict the reference 
of the normative predicates to the intended non-natural 
properties. 
The non-naturalists cannot adopt Fregean accounts of 
predicates either.17 According to them, there are two kinds 
                                                
16 See also, for example, Williams (2007: sec. 1.2), Sider (2011: 24–27), 
and Button (2013: sec. 2.3). It is true that this argument applies more 
generally also in the non-normative contexts and so we might think 
that Putnam’s argument does not pose a special problem for the non-
naturalists who are global descriptivists. However, for the sake of 
what will follow below, it is useful to introduce the problem here. The 
naturalists might think that they can use the causal powers of natural 
properties to overcome the model-theoretic objection. In §4, I will 
argue that this attempt will fail and then in §5 I will argue that the 
non-naturalists can give the same response to the objection as the 
naturalists. 
17 See Frege 1997b [1891]. Even if this view is discussed in this section, 
it is not a form of descriptivism. Frege’s idea was that the logical 
qualities of the predicates (mainly their unsaturatedness) are sufficient 
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of expressions. Names are ‘complete’ expressions because 
they refer to objects. In addition to them, there are also 
‘unsaturated’ expressions: predicates with empty places 
that can be filled up by names. Frege then understood the 
latter expressions with the analogy of mathematical 
functions. The idea is that the predicates refer to functions 
from objects to truth-values (True and False), which Frege 
thought to be the referents of the standard subject-
predicate sentences (Frege 1997b [1891]: 139–140).18  
This view, unfortunately, does not leave room for 
metaethical non-naturalism. Because for every assumed 
non-natural normative property there is a necessarily co-
instantiated natural property (see §1), there is also a 
necessarily co-extensive non-normative predicate for 
every normative predicate. Such predicates are long 
disjunctive predicates in which each disjunct consists of a 
long conjunction formulated in terms of the non-
normative predicates that wholly describe the natural 
properties of a given object. So, for ‘…is good’ there is a 
necessarily co-extensive predicate of the form ‘… is D1, D2, 
…, or Dn’.  
The problem is that functions are extensional.19 If two 
seemingly different functions have the same extension for 
every argument, they are the same function. If we in this 
situation understand predicates in the Fregean way as 
functions from arguments to truth-values, then the two 
predicates in the necessarily co-extensive normative and 
non-normative predicate pairs will refer always to the 
same function. As a consequence, the Fregean 
understanding of predicates leaves no room for the non-
naturalists to argue that normative predicates refer to 
something different (the sui generis normative properties) 
than to what the naturalists claim they refer.   
                                                                                                     
to fix their reference to functions. I argue below that this 
metasemantic account is not available for the non-naturalists because 
of the kind of semantic values it assigns for predicates. 
18 Frege called functions whose value is always a truth-value 
‘concepts’, which is why he thought that predicates refer to concepts, 
i.e., functions whose value is either True or False. 
19 See Miller (2007: 16). Frege himself, however, might have resisted 
this claim (Dummett 1981: 209). 
10 
 
3. Conceptual Role Semantics 
Ralph Wedgwood (2001 and 2007, ch. 4) has suggested 
that the non-naturalists too could use conceptual role 
semantics to explain how normative predicates acquire 
their reference. 20 Its starting point is that there are basic 
rules of use that determine both when each word of our 
language can be used rationally and what a speaker must 
understand in order to be competent with the meaning of 
a given word. Wedgwood then argues that these rules are 
sufficient to determine the reference of each word.21 The 
reference of a given word is roughly the object or a 
property that best makes sense of the basic rule that 
governs its rational use (Wedgwood 2001: 10).  
Take the logical connective ‘or’. According to Wedgwood, 
being competent with its meaning requires mastering two 
basic rules: (i) accepting <P> commits you to accepting <P 
or Q> and (ii) accepting <Q> commits you to accepting <P 
or Q> (Wedgwood 2001: 7). Their mastery consists of 
having a disposition to follow them in reasoning and of 
finding the transitions that comply with them obviously 
correct and in no need of further justification.  
Wedgwood then offers two principles of interpretation, 
validity and completeness, which take us from the basic 
rules to the referents (2001: 10–12 and 2007: 86–87). We 
must assign ‘or’ such a referent that in virtue of it (i) each 
instance of applying the previous two rules is ‘valid’ and 
(ii) the basic rule provides a ‘complete’ specification of the 
referent (Wedgwood 2001: 10). (i) entails that the referent 
must make it necessary that, if the input state to an 
inference according to the previous rules (belief that P, for 
                                                
20 As Wedgwood (2001, 7, fn. 12) acknowledges, his conceptual role 
semantics owes much to Christopher Peacocke’s (1987 and 1992: 1–40) 
account of logical constants. David Enoch (2011: sec. 7.6) has adopted 
Wedgwood’s semantic account (with minor amendments) to provide 
a non-naturalist account of reference. Wedgwood’s (2001 and 2007: ch. 
7) own formulation of the view is technical. Schroeter and Schroeter 
(2003: secs. 2–4) and Merli (2009: sec. 2) are helpful. 
21 Here Wedgwood follows Block (1987) and Peacocke (1987 and 1992: 
ch. 1). Harman (1999), in contrast, believes that conceptual role 
semantics conflicts with truth-conditional semantics, whereas Field 
(1977) takes the two elements of meaning, conceptual role and 
reference, to be independent of one another. 
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example) is true, then the conclusion state (belief that P or 
Q) is true too. (ii), in contrast, entails that the referent of 
‘or’ must make it impossible that the belief that P or Q is 
true except when the belief that P is true or the belief that 
Q is true.22 Wedgwood then claims that, because of these 
constraints set by the previous two rules of interpretation, 
the referent of ‘or’ must be the truth function of the 
classical disjunction as it is defined by the standard truth 
tables (Wedgwood 2001: 11).  
We must make a minor adjustment to the previous theory, 
because the relevant meaning-constituting basic rules of 
competence for normative predicates can contain practical 
mental states such as intentions, preferences, and plans. 
For example, the basic rule of competency for ‘better than’ 
is according to Wedgwood roughly the following: the 
rational acceptance of <X is better than Y> commits you to 
prefer X to Y (Wedgwood 2001: 15). Here the 
interpretation rules cannot be formulated in terms of 
truth-preservation because the output state, a preference, 
lacks a truth-value.  
Wedgwood therefore reformulates the interpretation rules 
in terms of more general correctness (Wedgwood 2001: 
18): the referents must (i) make following the basic rules 
‘correctness preserving’ (validity) and (ii) the output states 
of those rules correct only if the input states are correct 
(completeness). He then needs to explain what it is for 
preferences and other practical states to be correct in the 
same way as beliefs are correct when they are true. Here 
Wedgwood believes that it is enough to think that these 
states are correct when they conform to the goals of 
practical reasoning, whatever they may be (Wedgwood 
2001: 19).  
                                                
22 The basic rule captures the conditions in which it is a mistake to 
reject the conclusion state. The crux of completeness is that the 
meaning-constituting basic rules must capture all such conditions 
(Wedgwood 2001: 10–11). A set of rules does so when the conditions 
built into it are the only conditions in which rejecting the conclusion 
would be a mistake. Thus, the weaker referent ‘p or q or r’ would 
make inferences in accordance with the introduction rule for 
disjunction correct (and so this referent would satisfy validity) but it 
would not satisfy completeness because rejecting p or q is not a 
mistake when one believes that only r is true. 
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To what property does this account then fix the reference 
of ‘better than’? Wedgwood claims that this predicate 
must refer to the normative property of betterness, that is, 
the property of being what it is practically correct to prefer 
given the goals of practical reasoning, whatever they are, 
because only then it would be the case both that: 
• necessarily, if the input to using the previous basic rule 
is correct (the belief that X is better than Y is true), then 
preferring X to Y is correct (i.e., it conforms to the goals 
of practical reasoning, whatever they are) [and] 
• necessarily, preferring X to Y is correct (i.e., it conforms 
to the goals of practical reasoning, whatever they are) 
only if the belief that that X is better than Y is true. 
The idea is that, if ‘better than’ referred to any other 
property, then the previous conditionals would fail in 
some cases. That, however, just cannot happen because 
they capture the basic general rules of interpretation as 
they apply to the predicate in question.  
The problem of this metasemantic account in the non-
naturalists framework is that it cannot meet the Contrast 
Challenge.23 This is because the basic rule of competence 
for ‘better than’ and the two interpretation rules of 
validity and completeness are too sparse to fix the 
reference of this predicate uniquely to a non-natural 
property.  
According to Wedgwood, betterness is the property of 
being what it is correct to prefer given the goals of 
practical reasoning, whatever they are. This is because he 
believes that only if the latter property is the referent of 
‘better than’ validity and completeness will be respected. 
This means that the non-naturalists can adopt 
Wedgwood’s theory only if they think that the normative 
property of being what it is practically correct to prefer 
given the goals of practical reasoning, whatever they are, 
                                                
23 For alternative criticisms, see Schroeter and Schroeter (2003) and 
Merli (2009). Schroeter and Schroeter argue that Wedgwood’s 
conceptual roles for normative predicates either fail to rule out 
obviously non-normative referents or they presuppose a prior 
understanding of normative notions. Merli, in contrast, argues that 
Wedgwood’s account cannot be applied to moral normative notions. 
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is a sui generis non-natural property. The problem is that 
Wedgwood’s conceptual role account fails to fix the 
reference of ‘is better than’ uniquely to that kind of a 
property.  
In §1 we saw that there is a disjunctive natural property 
that would be necessarily co-instantiated with the 
assumed non-natural property of being what it is correct 
to prefer given the goals of practical reasoning, whatever 
they are. The worry is that, if ‘better than’ referred to this 
natural property, this too would (i) make all the instances 
of inferring in accordance to the meaning-constituting 
basic rule of competence for ‘better than’ valid and (ii) it 
would also enable that basic rule to provide a complete 
characterisation of the referent.  
According to this alternative interpretation, the input state 
to the rule – the belief that X is better than Y – attributes to 
preferring X to Y the natural property of being D1, D2, …, 
or Dn. When this belief is true, preferring X to Y will have 
exactly that natural property. This entails that inferring 
according to the rule ‘Acceptance of <X is better than Y> 
commits you to prefer X to Y’ will always be valid in 
Wedgwood’s sense. Necessarily, if the belief that 
constitutes the input to following this rule is true under 
the current assignment of reference (i.e., preferring X to Y 
has the natural property of being D1, D2, …, or Dn), then it 
will be correct to prefer X to Y given the goals of practical 
reasoning, whatever they are. This is because doing so will 
have the property of being D1, D2, …, or Dn and it and 
being correct given the goals of practical reasoning, 
whatever they are, are necessarily co-instantiated 
properties. 
The same goes for completeness. Completeness requires 
that, necessarily, preferring X to Y is correct (that is, it 
conforms to the goals of practical reasoning, whatever 
they are) only if the belief that X is better than Y is true. 
Or, in other words, it is impossible for the given 
preference to be correct given the goals of practical 
reasoning, whatever they are, except when the latter belief 
is true. Let us assume both (i) that the property of being 
D1, D2, …, or Dn is necessarily co-instantiated with the 
property of conforming to the goals of practical reasoning, 
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whatever they are, and (ii) that it is the referent of the 
predicate ‘…is better than…’. In this situation, it cannot be 
that preferring X to Y is correct and yet the belief 
according to which it has the property of being D1, D2, …, 
or Dn  is false. After all, given necessary co-instantiation, 
the correctness of a preference entails that it has the 
property of being D1, D2, …, or Dn.  
This means that the constraints provided by the two 
interpretation principles of validity and completeness 
leave it open whether ‘better than’ refers to the non-
natural property posited by the non-naturalists or to the 
natural property that is necessarily co-instantiated with it. 
Both potential referents satisfy the interpretation 
principles equally well. Because of this, Wedgwood’s 
conceptual role semantics fails to provide the non-
naturalists with a solution to the Contrast Challenge.24 We 
have been given no explanation of why the normative 
predicates would refer to the non-natural properties rather 
than to the underlying natural properties.  
4. Synthetic Naturalism and the Qua-Problem 
It could then be thought that different forms of synthetic 
naturalism will have a theoretical advantage: unlike the 
non-naturalists, their defenders can use the essential 
qualities of natural properties to explain reference 
(Dunaway and McPherson 2016: 1). Synthetic naturalists 
believe that normative properties are ordinary natural 
properties and thereby causally efficacious. Perhaps they 
could therefore rely on causal connections between the 
core uses of normative predicates and natural properties 
to explain how the normative predicates manage to refer. 
                                                
24 Wedgwood might endorse this result. He notes that the 
interpretation rules leave it open whether ‘or’ refers to the familiar 
truth function of disjunction or to the function that maps any two sets 
of possible worlds onto their union (Wedgwood 2001: 11). This is 
because both functions, given their isomorphic extensions, make sense 
of the basic rule of use for ‘or’ equally well. He also admits that, if the 
goal of practical reasoning can be described entirely in naturalist 
vocabulary, then the conceptual role semantic account of ‘… is better 
than…’ will be compatible with reductive naturalism (Wedgwood 
(2001: 20). 
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Let us begin from a well-known naturalist causal theory of 
how normative predicates acquire their reference (Boyd 
1988: especially 195).25 On this view, the uses of ‘good’ in 
our linguistic community are causally regulated by certain 
natural properties in a certain epistemically privileged 
way. When we causally interact with these properties, our 
assertions about what is good come to be more frequently 
true over time – under the assumption that we are 
referring to those properties. The claim then is that the 
reference of ‘good’ is directly fixed to the natural 
properties that causally regulate the core uses of this term 
in the previous reliability-conducive way. Boyd (1988: sec. 
4.3) also argues that, in the framework of this theory, we 
should think that ‘good’, for example, refers to a certain 
consequentialist homeostatic property cluster related to 
central human needs.  
For the present purposes, it does not matter which causal 
mechanism is argued to fix the reference of normative 
predicates or to which natural properties that mechanism 
is claimed to fix their reference. This is because all causal 
theories of reference face the same decisive objection, the 
so-called qua-problem.26 
The natural properties that causally regulate the core uses 
of normative predicates can only do so by causing token 
                                                
25 See also Schroeter & Schroeter (2013: sec. 3) and van Roojen (2015: 
sec. 11.2). Boyd’s account was inspired by the direct reference theories 
of Kripke (1980) and Putnam (1975). Other synthetic naturalists have 
developed improved versions of Boyd’s account (see, e.g., Brink (2001: 
167–170)). Also other types of causal theories of reference are available 
for the synthetic naturalists. Janice Dowell (2016), for example, applies 
Ruth Millikan’s (1984) teleological metasemantic account to normative 
predicates. On this view roughly, what property a predicate refers to 
is determined by which mapping has contributed in the normal 
circumstances causally to the selection of the ‘consumer systems’ of 
the audience. See fn. 28 below. 
26 See, for example, Papineau (1979, sec. 5.7) and Devitt & Sterelny 
(1987, secs. 4.4 and 5.3). For a modern version, see Sider (2011: 34–35). 
The standard objection to causal theories of reference in metaethics is 
the Moral Twin-Earth objection (Horgan and Timmons 1991, 1992a 
and 1992b). For responses, see Copp (2000); Dowell (2016); Dunaway 
and McPherson (2016); Laurence, Margolis, and Dawson (1999); Merli 
(2002); and van Roojen (2006).     
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uses. The synthetic naturalists must thus have in mind the 
following picture: 
Context1 Context2 Context3 Context4 ... 
Use1 Use2  Use3  Use4   ...
  
NP1I1 NP1I2  NP1I3  NP1I4  ... 
Here NPxIy stands for a token y of the instantiations of the 
natural property (NPx), which is assumed to causally 
regulate our uses of ‘good’ in the right way and which 
thus is its alleged referent. This property does the causal 
regulation by causing the core uses of ‘good’ in every 
normal context of use. The arrows then represent the 
causal relations between the relevant instantiations of the 
natural property and the token uses of the predicate. 
The instantiations of the relevant natural property, 
however, never directly cause ‘good’ to be used but rather 
this always happens through causal chains. First the 
instantiations of the natural property, which the 
naturalists take to regulate our uses of ‘good’, are caused 
by the instantiations of some other natural properties. The 
instantiations of that property then cause various other 
things to happen – such as certain processes in our brains 
– which finally cause us to use the predicate ‘good’ in 
thought and speech. The picture should thus be more like 
this: 
Context1 Context2 Context3 Context4 ... 
Use1 Use2  Use3  Use4   ... 
 
NP4I1 NP7I1  NP14I1  NP2I1  … 
 
NP1I1 NP1I2  NP1I3  NP1I4  … 
 
NP23I1 NP14I2  NP5I1  NP104I1  ... 
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This table represents the idea that, in the relevant causal 
chains, there is always one instantiation of a different 
natural property between the instantiations of the 
property that allegedly is the referent of ‘good’ and the 
relevant uses of the predicate. It also suggests that there is 
one instantiation of another natural property in these 
causal chains before the instantiation of the natural 
property that is the alleged referent of ‘good’. In these 
causal chains there will, however, always be many 
instantiations of many different natural properties both 
between the core uses and the instantiations of the alleged 
referent natural property and also before the relevant 
instantiations of that natural property. 
As a consequence, there will be many disjunctive 
properties that are always present in the relevant causal 
chains that connect the instantiations of the natural 
property that is claimed to be the referent of ‘good’ to the 
core uses of ‘good’. In the previous table, one such 
property would the property of being NP4-in-Context1-or-
NP7-in-Context2-or-NP14-in-Context3-or-NP2-in-Context4-
or-…-or-NP11-in-Contextn. By selecting instantiations of 
different natural properties from the relevant causal 
chains in this way, we can pick out uncountably many 
new gerrymandered disjunctive properties that are part of 
all the same causal chains with the core uses of ‘good’ as 
NP1.27  
The qua-problem is the concern that, if NP1 is causally 
connected to the core uses of ‘good’ in the way specified 
by the naturalists’ causal metasemantic theory, then all the 
previous disjunctive properties will be causally connected 
to the same core uses exactly in the same way. Hence, if 
NP1 is claimed to causally regulate the core uses in the 
right way, the constructed properties must do so too. This 
                                                
27 We might be even able to form a single aggregated property from all 
the disjuncts in all the relevant causal chains, which would leave us 
with a single horribly gerrymandered natural property. The problem 
is that the causal theories of reference as such leave it open whether 
the normative predicates would refer to this type of properties, the 
original natural properties that the naturalists take to be the referents, 
or the other gerrymandered natural properties we can construct that 
are always co-present. 
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leaves the reference of ‘good’ underdetermined. Given the 
constraints set by the synthetic naturalists’ causal theories 
of reference, the referent of ‘good’ could be any one of the 
natural properties that are a part of the very same causal 
chains. For this reason, no amount of theorizing about 
causal connections will solve the problem.28  
5. Reference Magnetism and Non-Naturalism 
In the previous argument, nothing turns on the fact that 
we are discussing normative predicates. The qua-problem 
is, after all, a general challenge for all causal-historic 
theories of reference no matter to what expressions they 
are applied. The synthetic naturalists should therefore 
begin from how the problem can be solved elsewhere.  
The most promising solution to the qua-problem relies on 
‘reference magnetism’.29 On this view, properties are on a 
spectrum with respect to how similar having them makes 
their bearers. It is a brute fact that some properties are 
elite: having them constitutes fundamental structural 
similarities between objects. Metaphorically speaking, 
                                                
28 This shows how causal relations are less fine-grained than semantic 
ones (Loewer 1997: 112). It could be responded that more 
sophisticated causal theories of reference will have resources to deal 
with this problem. On the behalf of Boyd it could be suggested that, 
even if the gerrymandered properties are part of the same causal 
chains as the intended referents, they do not causally explain the 
relevant uses of ‘good’ as well. Likewise, drawing from Millikan, it 
could be argued that the gerrymandered properties fail to explain for 
which mapping relation the relevant consumer systems are selected in 
evolution. As Sider (2011: 30) notes, the relevant question then is: why 
would the gerrymandered properties provide worse evolutionary 
explanations or worse explanations of our core uses? The intended 
referents seem to offer better explanations precisely because they are 
less gerrymandered – they are more brute similarities in nature. This 
is why the natural defenses of Boyd and Millikan lead to the 
metasemantic framework discussed in the next section. 
29 This theory was first proposed by G.H. Merrill (1980). It is 
standardly attributed to David Lewis (1983, 1984, and 1986), even if 
Schwarz (2014) argues that it wasn’t Lewis’s view. For recent 
defenses, see Brian Weatherson (2003) and Ted Sider (2011: sec. 3.2). It 
is sometimes suggested that the referential intentions of the speakers 
suffice to solve the qua-problem. Such solutions, however, fail to 
explain how the referential intentions manage to refer to the salient 
properties (Lewis 1984, 226). 
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these properties constitute nature’s joints. For example, 
the property of being gold is an elite property, because its 
bearers must have the atomic number 79. This 
microphysical property constitutes a fundamental 
similarity between the objects that have the property in 
question. In contrast, fashionableness is not elite: trench 
coats and dinner parties, for example, need not have much 
in common qua being fashionable. Properties are not, of 
course, either wholly elite or not elite at all but rather they 
can be more or less elite depending on how structurally 
similar objects are in virtue of having them.  
Reference magnetism then is the view that the more elite a 
property is the more intrinsically eligible it is for being the 
referent for a given predicate: in other words, elite 
properties function as ‘reference magnets’.30 Hence, when 
the other constraints on the assignment of reference (such 
fitting linguistic usage, preserving the truth of our first-
order theories, and making sense of inferential 
connections) leave many properties as eligible candidates, 
the genuine referent is the most elite of those properties. 
According to the reference magnetism, the reference of 
our predicates attaches more easily to such properties.31  
                                                
30 In addition, elite properties are also thought to feature in genuine 
laws and claims including them are claimed to be easier to confirm 
(Dunaway 2016, 249; Sider 2012: ch. 3).  
31 This solution may seem like an ad hoc response to the previous 
problem (Putnam 1981: 53). Reference magnetism can, however, be 
motivated by the fact that it offers a response to a range of semantic 
paradoxes such as Quine’s (1960) argument for indeterminacy of 
translation, Putnam’s permutation argument (§2), and the rule-
following paradox (Kripke 1982) based on an attractive metaphysical 
theory (Dunaway and McPherson 2016: sec. 1.3). Secondly, semantic 
accounts can be used to explain linguistic behaviour. In this situation, 
reference magnetism can be motivated with the theoretical virtue of 
simplicity as it guides us to prefer explanations based on sparse 
properties (Williams 2007: sec. 2). Despite these advantages, the idea 
of reference magnetism remains controversial (see, e.g., Schwarz 
(2014) and Sundell (2012)). My conclusion is thus modest: if reference 
magnetism is a viable metasemantic view, then the non-naturalists 
can use it to explain how normative predicates refer to non-natural 
properties. This corresponds to Dowell’s (2016) argumentative 
strategy; she argues that, if Millikan’s teleosemantics – a controversial 
metasemantic position – is along the right lines, then the Moral Twin 
Earth objection to synthetic naturalism fails. There may well also be 
20 
 
Synthetic naturalists can use the previous theory to solve 
the qua-problem.32 Boyd, for example, could argue that the 
consequentialist homeostatic property cluster related to 
human needs is the most elite candidate for being the 
referent of ’good’ of all the natural properties that causally 
regulate the core uses of this predicate in the right way. 
After all, all the other properties that belong to the 
relevant causal chains are disjunctive properties 
constructed from the instantiations of different natural 
properties in the situations in which the consequentialist 
homeostatic property cluster is also present. Boyd could 
then claim that, because the latter property is the most 
elite candidate, it attracts the reference of ‘good’. 
There is, however, nothing causal about reference 
magnetism. The lesson of the qua-problem is that 
causation always leaves room for many eligible candidates 
when we consider to what a given word refers. If the more 
elite candidates are then to attract reference, they must do 
so in some non-causal way. Because of this, there is no 
antecedent reason to think that only natural properties – 
given how naturalness is understood in metaethics in terms of 
causally efficacy, a posteriori knowability, and being a part of 
the best explanations of natural and social sciences – can 
function as reference magnets.33 This means that non-
naturalists too should at least in principle be in a position 
to solve the metasemantic challenges facing them by 
relying on reference magnetism on the condition that they 
can argue that the non-natural properties are elite and 
thus function as reference magnets (see §5.1 below).  
                                                                                                     
other metasemantic accounts that could help the non-naturalists to 
avoid the problem too (see, for example, Grice (1957) and Horwich 
(1998)). Here I only want to suggest that there is at least one such 
account. 
32 Synthetic naturalists have already relied on reference magnetism to 
respond to the Moral Twin-Earth objection (van Roojen 2006; 
Dunaway and McPherson 2016). Dunaway (2015 and 2016) has 
argued that the non-naturalists should rely on reference magnetism 
both to distinguish their view from forms of quasi-realism and to 
respond to Jackson’s (1998) objection to non-naturalism. 
33 Lewis (1983: 346) defined naturalness in terms of eliteness, which 
makes the claim that only natural properties are reference magnets 
trivial. Metaethical non-naturalists can agree that normative 
properties are natural if naturalness is understood in this way.   
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Of course, a certain amount of modesty is called for at this 
point.34 As explained in fn. 31, it is worth highlighting that 
reference magnetism itself remains a controversial 
metasemantic view. The aim of this section is therefore 
merely to make two suggestions. Firstly and as I have 
already argued, the metaethical naturalists too have at 
least some good reasons to rely on reference magnetism 
and thus they are likely to be ‘companions of guilt’. 
Secondly and as I will argue below, if the phenomenon of 
reference magnetism exists as many have thought and the 
non-natural properties are elite, then the non-naturalists 
seem to be in a position to rely on reference magnetism to 
solve the metasemantic challenges facing them.  
To see how the non-naturalists might carry out this 
project, let us consider global descriptivism described in 
§2. According to it, normative predicates refer to whatever 
properties they must in order for our carefully considered 
normative convictions to be true. Let us assume that the 
non-naturalists then combine this metasemantic theory 
with reference magnetism – the view according to which, 
when there are many eligible candidates, the most elite 
attract reference.35 We can then consider whether non-
naturalists could use the previous combination of views to 
meet the metasemantic challenges introduced in §1. I will 
begin from the easiest challenge and then move onto the 
more difficult ones. 
5.1 The Gruesome Normative Property Challenge  
The non-naturalists have always believed that normative 
properties are simple, sui generis, non-reducible brute 
                                                
34 According to Dunaway, non-naturalists should rely on reference 
magnetism also to explain both (i) why there is no widespread 
indeterminacy in what normative predicates refer to and (ii) how 
communities who use these terms differently can still disagree 
(Dunaway 2016: sec. 10.3.1).  
35 This view follows Sider (2011: 31–33; see also Dunaway 2016: 252). 
For reasons explained by Sider (2011: 31), we should not understand 
reference magnetism to be a metasemantic view of its own (there are 
after all words that do not refer to elite properties) but rather as a 
‘meta-metasemantic’ view, which may be combined with other 
metasemantic views. The metasemantic views tell us about the nature 
of reference whereas reference magnetism determines to which 
eligible candidate the reference-relations attach. 
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similarities that belong to the ‘fundamental nature of the 
universe’ (Ross 2002 [1930]: 29–30). One benefit of this 
metaphysical foundation of non-naturalism is that it 
makes the normative properties perfectly elite on the 
criterion of eliteness specified above.36 It is natural to think 
that especially the simplicity of the posited non-natural 
normative properties makes these properties excellent 
candidates for being perfectly elite. When we take a less 
than perfectly elite property, the constitution of such 
properties can be understood to be analysable in terms of 
other, more basic properties exactly as Lewis (1984: 228) 
thought. When it comes to simple properties that have no 
other properties as their constituents, there just is no way 
of giving an account of these properties in terms of 
anything more basic. The having of such properties is a 
matter of being similar in a fundamental, brute way, 
which is exactly why it is appealing to think that the 
properties in question are perfectly elite.  
Gruesome normative properties are, in contrast, less elite 
given that objects that have them need not have much in 
common (consider, for example, any good action inside 
our light cone and a cruel one outside it). Because more 
elite properties then attract reference more easily, the 
normative predicates, in virtue of their simplicity, can be 
argued to refer to the standard non-natural normative 
properties instead of their gruesome counterparts (see 
Lewis 1984: 228 and Sider 2011: 33). 
                                                
36 There are places where Lewis (1984: 228) defines the most 
fundamental microphysical properties as perfectly elite and then 
claims that how elite other properties are is a matter of the length of 
their canonical definitions in terms of the perfectly elite properties 
(Lewis 1986: 61). For why this view of eliteness fails, see Dunaway 
(2016: 251–252), Hawthorne (2006: 206 and 2007: 434), Schroeter & 
Schroeter (2013: 17), and Williams (2007). For this reason, I follow 
Dunaway and McPherson (2016: sec. 3.2) and Schroeter & Schroeter 
(2013: 18) in understanding degrees of eliteness as a primitive notion 
that refers to brute similarities in the world. For a discussion, see 
Dunaway (2016: 251). Dunaway (ibid.) also rightly points out that 
non-naturalists have not explicitly stated their views in terms of 
eliteness.  
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5.2 The Contrast Challenge  
Can the non-naturalists use reference magnetism also to 
explain why normative predicates refer to non-natural 
properties instead of natural properties? Global 
descriptivism may at first seem to rule out most natural 
properties as potential referents of normative predicates. 
According to it, the referents of the normative predicates 
must make our carefully considered normative 
convictions true. Consider then all the objects that are 
good according to those convictions. Due to the previous 
interpretation rule, ‘good’ could only refer to a natural 
property that is had by all of them. However, given how 
many different kinds of actions, character-traits, and states 
of affairs we take to be good, the global descriptivist 
interpretation principle does not seem to leave many 
natural properties to be eligible candidates for being the 
referent of ‘good’ (McDowell 1998 [1981], 201–202).  
We know, however, that at least one eligible natural 
candidate must remain. According to the non-naturalists, 
all objects that are good according to our carefully 
considered convictions have a certain non-natural 
property. If that property were the referent of ‘good’, 
those convictions would clearly be true. They would be 
ascribing a property to a set of objects, which all of them 
would have. Given the reasoning explained in §1, we 
know that there is a natural property that would be 
necessarily co-instantiated with the previous non-natural 
property. If that natural property were the referent of 
‘good’, this too would make our carefully considered 
convictions equally true (§2). 
Here the non-naturalists can rely on reference magnetism 
to explain why ‘good’ would refer to the non-natural 
property rather than to the necessarily co-instantiated 
natural property. The thought is that ‘good’ refers to the 
non-natural property because it is more elite than the 
natural property in question (Dunaway 2015: 650). As 
already explained in §5.1, the non-naturalists’ 
metaphysical theory makes the non-natural normative 
properties perfectly elite, whereas the necessarily co-
instantiated natural property could hardly be as elite. That 
property is, after all, a disjunctive property in which each 
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disjunct consists of all the natural properties of a given 
object that is good according to our carefully considered 
convictions.  
The problem is that different objects that have the 
underlying disjunctive natural property are not very 
similar to one another qua having that property. Take, for 
example, a just global distribution of resources and Mary’s 
act of helping her elderly aunt with her shopping, which 
are both good things. These objects are, however, not very 
similar to one another in virtue of all the natural properties 
they have. The former state of affairs affects billions across 
the globe, whereas the latter concerns only two 
individuals locally. Because of this, the non-naturalists can 
argue that, of the eligible candidates, the relevant non-
natural properties are more elite than the underlying 
necessarily co-instantiated natural properties, and 
therefore they must be the referents of the normative 
predicates.37 
Lewis (1984) argued that reference magnetism also blocks 
Putnam’s permutation-challenge. §2 explained how our 
best first-order normative theory remains true even when 
we re-assign new referents to all the expressions used to 
formulate that theory. So, ‘eating meat is wrong’ remains 
true when ‘eating meat’ refers to trench coats and ‘is 
                                                
37 It could be objected that the disjunctive natural property need not be 
the only natural property shared by all good things (perhaps the 
disjunctiveness is merely a matter of the logical complexity of the 
predicate in question rather than a genuine feature of the world). It 
could be, for example, thought that the shared natural property must 
be an empirical dimension of similarity on which the normative 
properties supervene – a pattern relevant from the point of view of 
normative thinking (Jackson, Smith, and Pettit 2000). Good things 
could thus also have, for example, the property of maximizing the 
amount of pleasure or the property of being the object of consistent 
rational willing, and they certainly have the sociological property of 
being conventionally good. Given that all the previous natural 
properties are presumably less elite than the perfectly elite natural 
properties such as having a negative electric charge, it is not obvious 
that they would be as elite as the equally perfectly elite simple non-
natural properties posited by the non-naturalists. It is true, however, 
that the non-naturalists will need to be able to explain at this point 
how, for the purposes of the relevant comparisons, we are to evaluate 
how elite the allegedly less than perfectly natural properties are (see 
Schroeter & Schroeter (2013: 18–20)). 
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wrong’ to being fashionable. If we keep reassigning 
referents like this in a systematic, structurally isomorphic 
way (§2), then no part of our first-order theory becomes 
false even with the crazy new referents. Given the 
constraints set by global descriptivism and the possibility 
of this type of permutations, the normative predicates 
could thus refer to any natural properties.   
Lewis’s insight was that, even if global descriptivism fails 
to rule out the crazy new assignments of reference, 
reference magnetism can do so (Lewis 1984: 227). Consider 
the previous example. According to the non-naturalists’ 
original interpretation, a certain simple non-natural 
property is the referent of ‘good’. Given the possibility of 
permutations, global descriptivism, however, means that 
this predicate could equally well refer to any natural 
property as we can find suitable new referents to all other 
words to make our first-order normative theory true even 
in that case. Reference magnetism, however, rules out all 
the new re-assignments that give ‘good’ a natural referent 
that is less elite than the initial non-natural property.  
According to the non-naturalists, the non-natural property 
of goodness is perfectly elite: it stands for a fundamental 
brute similarity in the universe – it carves the universe at 
its joints. This means that the non-naturalists can 
reasonably rule out all the less than perfectly elite 
candidate referents that are acquired through the 
permutations. They can exclude not only fashionableness 
but also almost all other natural properties too (fn. 37). In 
fact, perhaps the only eligible equally perfectly elite 
natural property candidates would be the fundamental 
physical properties of mass, charge, quark colour and 
flavour, and the like (Lewis 1984: 228, but see fn. 35 
above).  
Furthermore, even the idea that normative predicates 
could refer to the most fundamental microphysical 
properties is problematic. In order to make our best first-
order normative theory true, we would need to assign a 
different microphysical property as a referent for every 
normative predicate given that our best first-order 
normative theory gives different extensions for different 
normative properties. This means that a successful 
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reassignment of referents in a permutation would require 
that there were exactly as many fundamental 
microphysical properties as there are normative properties 
according to our best first-order normative theory.38 Given 
how unlikely this is, normative predicates probably 
cannot be permutated to refer to the fundamental 
microphysical properties either. 
This means that the non-naturalists seem able to exclude 
the permutations that assign either perfectly elite natural 
properties or other less elite natural properties to be the 
referents of normative predicates.39 Because of this, the 
non-naturalists have reason for optimism: the combination 
of global descriptivism and reference magnetism seems to 
help them to respond to the Contrast Challenge. 
5.3 The Correct Property Challenge 
 This leaves us with the most difficult challenge: why does 
‘good’, for example, refer to the non-natural property 
goodness rather than to any other non-natural normative 
property? Here the non-naturalists cannot rely on 
reference magnetism because presumably all non-natural 
normative properties are equally elite. The non-naturalists 
might perhaps suggest that ‘good’ could not refer to 
                                                
38 That this possibility exists illustrates how there are ways the world 
could be in which reference magnetism would not solve Putnam’s 
paradox. Williams (2007: sec. 3) offers an account of precisely when 
the conditions for this are met. He (2007: sec. 4) also explains why we 
might actually be in circumstances in which reference magnetism 
does not rule out that our ordinary expressions have crazy referents 
such as numbers. For a further development of Williams’s concerns, 
see Hawthorne (2007). If reference magnetism fails to solve the 
general semantic paradoxes, then both naturalists and non-naturalists 
face exactly the same metasemantic problems. 
39 It could also be objected that, assuming global descriptivism and 
reference magnetism, some of our ordinary non-normative predicates 
could end up referring to the non-natural normative properties given 
that such properties would be perfectly elite and thus able to attract 
the reference of this terms if the use of these terms at least roughly 
fitted this interpretation (see Sundell (2012), Schroeter & Schroeter 
(2013), and Williams (2015)). However, if our ordinary non-normative 
predicates referred to the non-natural properties, then we would be 
unable to know whether they applied to an actual object a posteriori.  If 
‘red’ thus referred to a non-natural property, then we would be 
unable to know whether an object is red just by looking at it.  
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wrongness, for instance, because this would make many 
of our core normative convictions false. If ‘good’ referred 
to wrongness, a just distribution of resources could not, 
for example, be good.  
This response, however, takes us right back to Putnam’s 
paradox. The problem is that, if global descriptivism were 
the only constraint on interpretation, this would allow us 
to give new referents also for all the expressions that are 
used to refer to different actions, character traits, states of 
affairs, and the like. With a suitable re-assignment of 
referents for these expressions (which also does not give 
them less elite referents), our normative convictions 
would remain true even if our normative predicates 
referred to different non-natural normative properties 
than usually thought. The combination of global 
descriptivism and reference magnetism thus fails to solve 
the most difficult metasemantic challenge.  
Let me finish by outlining how the non-naturalists could 
respond to this final objection by drawing from moral 
functionalism.40 I have so far referred loosely to our best 
first-order normative theory, which I have assumed to 
consist of our carefully considered normative convictions 
about what one ought to do in different situations, what 
reasons there are for different actions in them, what is 
good and bad, and so on. Yet, our best first-order 
normative theory can also be understood to contain a set 
of platitudes that connect different normative predicates 
to one another. These platitudes make explicit defeasible 
inferential connections between different predicates, 
which their competent users must master (see §3 above 
and Jackson and Pettit (1995: 22–24)). Jackson, for 
example, gives the following examples this type of 
platitudes: ‘courageous people are more likely to do what 
is right than cowardly people’, ‘the best option is the right 
option’, and ‘rights impose duties’ (Jackson 1998: 130–
131). 
The non-naturalists could then agree with Jackson and 
Pettit (1995: 24–25) that one central element of the 
meaning of a given normative predicate is the place it has 
                                                
40 See Jackson and Pettit (1995) and Jackson (1998: ch. 5). 
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in the network constituted by the previous 
interconnecting platitudes. This element of meaning then 
provides an additional constraint, which the correct 
assignment of reference must satisfy.  The idea is roughly 
that the place of a given normative predicate in the 
network provides a ‘job description’, which a property 
must fulfil if it is to be an eligible candidate for being the 
referent of the predicate (Schroeter and Schroeter 2003: 
191). This means that the normative property to which, 
say, ‘good’ refers must be related to other normative 
properties in the way in which the network of the 
interconnecting platitudes relates the property to other 
properties in our best first-order normative theory. 
The non-naturalists could then use this additional 
metasemantic constraint to explain why ‘good’, for 
example, must refer to goodness instead of any other 
normative property. For this to succeed, the 
interconnecting network of platitudes must have one 
important feature: it must be asymmetric. The network of 
relations ascribed to a given normative property by the 
interconnecting platitudes must be unique: structurally 
different from how all other properties in the network 
relate to each other.41 If this condition is satisfied, then the 
account will be able to explain why ‘good’ can only refer 
to goodness rather than to any other non-natural 
normative property.  
This is because, if ‘good’ in this situation referred to any 
other property, that property would not be related to the 
other normative properties in a structurally isomorphic 
way to how goodness relates to other properties. As a 
consequence, at least some of the interconnecting 
platitudes in which the predicate ‘good’ features would be 
false, no matter how we tried to reassign different 
normative properties to be the referents of the other 
normative predicates. This is why the network 
understanding of the meaning of normative predicates 
promises to help the non-naturalists to solve the Correct 
                                                
41 See Smith (1994: 48–54). Smith (1994: 54–56) is skeptical about 
whether there is enough substance in the platitudes to provided the 
necessary asymmetry. James Lenman (2006: sec. 4.3) is more 
optimistic. 
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Property Challenge – as long as our best first-order 
normative theory connects different normative predicates 
to each other in structurally asymmetric ways. 
6. Conclusion 
In conclusion then, the non-naturalists appear to be in a 
position to explain how the normative predicates manage 
to refer to the non-natural properties as they are 
characterized by the non-naturalists core metaphysical 
commitments. By adopting a combination of global 
descriptivism, reference magnetism, and a network 
account of the meaning of normative predicates, the non-
naturalists are in a position to explain (i) why normative 
predicates do not refer to gruesome properties, (ii) why 
they refer to non-natural properties rather than to natural 
properties, and (iii) why the non-natural properties refer 
to the non-natural properties they do rather than to some 
other non-natural properties.  
This is significant because, in addition to the already well-
known metaphysical assumptions of the non-naturalists, 
the previous metasemantic explanations rely only on 
elements of metasemantic views, which are already 
widely accepted by many naturalists. This means that, 
other than objecting to their metaphysical commitments in 
the old-fashioned way, the naturalists cannot have any 
additional objections to non-naturalism on metasemantic 
grounds. Both metaethical naturalists and non-naturalists 
must rely on the very same theories in metasemantics, and 
so we must decide between the views on some other 
grounds.  
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